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Abstract 
The South African government debt has risen alarmingly over the last decade, with the 
debt-to-GDP ratio increasing from 33% in 1985 to 57% in 1995. These debt movements, 
combined with historically high conventional deficits equal to 9.0% and 9.8% of GDP in 
1993 and 1994 respectively, have cast doubt on the solvency of government. 
This paper considers the issue of government solvency by focusing on two questions. 
Firstly, "Are present fiscal policies sustainable?", and secondly, "What are the limits to 
future fiscal policy if government solvency is to be maintained?" 
The sustainability of present fiscal policy is tested by examining whether or not 
government is obeying its intertemporal budget constraint. This constraint demands that 
the present value of future government debt must be zero. If the present value of future 
debt is greater than zero, government is insolvent. 
By manipulating the intertemporal budget constraint, it is shown that for the present value 
of future debt to be zero, government spending and revenue must be cointegrated. These 
series are tested for cointegration using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. The results 
show that while fiscal policy in the 1960s and 1970s was sustainable, the same cannot be 
said for fiscal policy since 1982. The relationship between spending and revenue has 
weakened, and maintaining the current fiscal stance will inevitably result in government 
becoming insolvent. 
The limits to future fiscal policy are determined by reformulating the collateral constraint. 
It is shown that, for any expected average GDP growth and interest rates, the maximum 
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the results show that government solvency depends critically on economic growth. If real 
GDP growth can average 4% per annum, and if real interest rates can fall to 5%, there is 
little danger of government becoming insolvent. If tax revenues grow apace with GDP, 
government expenditure growth of 4% is consistent with government solvency. 
However, if real GDP growth rates of 3% or less are achieved, government solvency 
appears inevitable. Government will have to sell off state assets to supplement revenue, 
and even then a portion of the debt may have to be monetised. Increased inflation would 
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CHAPTER! 
Introduction 
Fiscal sustainability in the broadest sense refers to government's ability to maintain 
fiscal policies indefinitely. Fiscal policy is sustainable if the current trends in government 
expenditure and tax revenues do not lead to macroeconomic instability which would in 
tum enforce a change in government's fiscal stance. 
The sustainability of fiscal policy is threatened, inter alia, when the stock of 
government debt becomes excessively high. Government can finance its deficit by issuing 
government bonds, but the public will only take up these bond issues if they have 
confidence in government's ability to redeem the debt. If high stocks of government debt 
erode the public's confidence in government solvency, government will be forced to 
redeem the debt by printing money. The increased growth in the money supply will 
increase inflation which, in tum, could decrease m croeconomic stability. 
The relationship between high government debt and inflation permits the 
development of a narrower definition of fiscal sustainability. For the purposes of this 
paper, fiscal policy is understood as being sustainable if future fiscal deficits can be funded 
entirely through bond sales and do not necessitate the printing of money to redeem bonds. 
Deficits need to be financed by money creation when the public loses confidence in 
government's solvency and is no longer willing to take up bond issues. The general 
perception of government solvency is thus central to the concept of fiscal sustainability. A 
popular and accessible monitor of changes in government solvency is the debt-to-GDP 
ratio (hereafter referred to as the debt ratio). Historically, the debt ratio has increased 
during wars and major depressions, but has decreased steadily during years of peace and 
average economic growthl. This trend has changed in South Africa since 1980, with the 
debt ratio increasing regardless of the rate of economic growth. The increasing debt ratio 
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has called into question the solvency of government under the current fiscal stance, and 
increased the concern that current levels of debt could lead to high rates of inflation and 
macroeconomic instability. 
As argued above, fiscal sustainability depends on government remaining solvent. 
To determine the sustainability of fiscal policy, we have to determine whether or ndt fiscal 
policies are consistent with government solvency. Will government remain solvent if the 
current fiscal stance is maintained, or will future deficits have to be financed through 
money creation? 
While an exploration of the above question would reveal much about present fiscal 
policy, it would reveal little about the paths future fiscal policy should follow if solvency is 
to be maintained. More specifically, what is the maximum rate at which government 
" 
expenditure can grow without rendering government insolvent, given certain rates of 
taxes? 
This paper will consider both the sustainability of current fiscal policy as well as 
the constraints on future policy in the South African context. The South African 
government faces a high demand for expenditures to improve social services where 
needed, but government's ability to increase tax revenues is limited. Any additional 
expenditure over and above tax revenues has to be financed through bond sales, but the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is already nearly 60%2. To what extent can government borrow to 
finance further expenditure and still remain solvent? 
The literature presents three approaches to answering these questions. The first 
approach examines the debt-to-GDP ratio, and considers the factors that cause the ratio to 
change. This approach reveals a limited amount about the direction of change in 
government solvency, but discloses little about solvency itself This approach can show 
what fiscal policy stance will maintain the indicators of solvency at their present levels, but 
cannot identifY what fiscal stance will actually maintain solvency. Various studies have 
2 A debt ratio of 60% has no particular theoretical significance. It is used rule of thwnb as a prudent ceiling level for 
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applied this approach to South Africa, including Roux (1994), van der Merwe (1994), and 
ABSA (1996). 
The second approach employs the intertemporal budget constraint as developed by 
McCallum (1984), which shows that governments cannot run conventional deficits 
indefinitely. Cointegration tests are applied to national public finance data to determine 
whether or not the constraint is being obeyed. The seminal article using this approach was 
authored by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The cointegration tests examine the stability of 
the relationships between either government spending and revenue, or the deficit and debt. 
If these relationships are unstable, it can be shown that government is not obeying its 
intertemporal budget constraint. 
A limitation to testing the intertemporal budget constraint is that cointegration 
tests do not take into account the additional constraint that government debt may not 
exceed the present value of all future tax revenues. Thus a third approach is considered, 
namely the use of the collateral constraint. The importance of the collateral constraint was 
emphasised by Barro (1976) and Kremers (1989), but neither author reviewed the 
implications of the constraint in any depth. If various assumptions are made about future 
interest rates and the limits to government's ability to raise tax revenues, the collateral 
constraint determines the limits to expenditure growth for any given economic growth 
rate. In other words, for an assumed rate of economic growth, an upper bound can be 
calculated for the rate of expenditure growth consistent with government solvency. 
This paper will employ all three approaches to answering questions about the 
sustainability of fiscal policy. Firstly, movements in the debt ratio and related indicators 
such as the primary and conventional deficit-to-GDP ratios will be considered to provide 
some background on the South African debt situation. Secondly, the sustainability of 
present fiscal policy will be tested by applying cointegration tests to the intertemporal 
budget constraint. These cointegration tests will focus on the relationship between 
government expenditure and revenue. The results of these tests will indicate whether 
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Thirdly and finally, sustainable paths for future fiscal policy will be estimated by 
manipulating the collateral constraint and making assumptions about future growth and 
interest rates. This approach emphasises the relationships between fiscal policy, interest 
rates and growth rates, and identifies at what rate government expenditure can grow. Such 
an analysis defines the limits to spending given the stock of government debt. 
Chapter 2 reviews the South African debt situation. Chapter 3 reviews literature 
dealing with debt, and Chapter 4 tests whether present South African fiscal policy is 
sustainable. Chapter 5 identifies sustainable government revenue and expenditure growth 
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CHAPTER 2 
A Review of South African Debt Indicators 
2.1 Introduction 
Fiscal sustainability is important because it contributes to overall macroeconomic 
stability. If unsustainable fiscal policies are maintained, government will be unable to 
service its debts. Inevitably, government will have to default on its debt commitments, or 
resort to inflationary money creation. Both increased inflation and debt repudiation would 
be destabilising and could negatively effect economic growth. 
If the level of government debt makes debt-induced macroeconomic instability 
inevitable, government is said to have fallen into a debt trap. More rigorously, a debt trap 
is defined as " ... an unsustainable government financial position in which an 'explosion' in 
the government debt ratio can no longer be prevented by an increase in the ratio of 
government taxation to gross domestic product or by a decrease in discretionary 
government expenditure (total expenditure less interest payments) relative to gross 
domestic product." (Van der Merwe, 1993, p. 2). 
If debt keeps increasing, the debt servicing costs escalate. When interest costs 
become so high that debt can no longer be serviced through tax revenue, government will 
be forced to borrow to service the debt. Government debt will increase, and the public will 
be reluctant to take up further debt issues if they doubt government's ability to redeem the 
debt. Government will then be forced to pay the interest costs on debt by printing more 
money. Loss of control over the money supply is inevitable under these conditions, and 
inflation will spirae. 
3 ill the short tenn, an Wlexpected increase in inflation could reduce the real interest rate on the existing stock of 
government debt. ill the long fWl, however, the possibility of Wlexpected inflation would increase the risk of 
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2.2 The South African Public Debt Situation 
A perception has developed4 that South Africa's present fiscal policy may 
unsustainable, and that the country is moving irreversibly towards a situation of spiralling 
debt and interest costs. The factors that have given rise to this perception must be 
examined. 
Anticipation of a debt trap has been driven largely by the partly incorrect belief that 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio has increased continuously over the last decade and a 
half Movements in the total government debt-to-GDP ratio for this period (illustrated in 














Figure 2.1. South Africa's Debt-to-GDP Ratio: 
1960 - 1995 
Year ending 31 March 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
Figure 2.1 shows the debt ratio reaching a historic low of approximately 31 % in 
1981. The ratio increases gradually until 1986, and then escalates until 1995. This does 
suggest cause for concern, as the rapid increase in the debt ratio could well be perceived 
as irreversible. But Figure 2.1 presents a somewhat incorrect picture of the debt situation 
in that it does not include government financial guarantees in the total debt figure. These 
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were largely loans to TBVC countries, guaranteed by the South African government, and 
should therefore be included in the debt total. The adjusted, more accurate debt ratio 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 paints a different picture of debt ratio movements over the last 
twenty years. 
If guaranteed loan financing is included in government debt, the largest increase in 
the ratio occurs in 1976, when South Africa established the first independent homelands. 
The ratio remained constant throughout the 1980s, but increased during the 1990s. The 
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Figure 2.2. Debt plus Financial Guarantees to GOP: 
1960 - 1995 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
Year ending 31 March 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
A related indicator that casts doubt on the financial soundness of government is the 
ratio of interests costs on government debt to GDP. If interest costs are spiralling, debt 
will increase, and this will cause an even greater increase in interest costs. As Figure 2.3 
indicates, increasing interest costs relative to GDP have been a feature of the past decade. 
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remained high because of the Reserve Bank's tight monetary stance aimed at decreasing 
inflation, as well as decreased government saving since 19845• 
en -en 0 
0 -en ! 
II) -.5 
Figure 2.3. Interest Costs as a percentage of GOP: 








Year ending 31 II/Iarch 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
A final indicator of possible fiscal crisis is the conventional deficit, defined as the 
difference between total government expenditure including interest costs and total 
government revenue. It is usually expressed as a percentage of GDP. While it has 
fluctuated dramatically over the last decade, historically high deficits of 9.0% and 9.8% 
were recorded in the 1993 and 1994 financial years. The deficit decreased to 5.6% and 6% 
in 1995 and 1996 respectively (Budget Review, March 1996, p. B.58), but these declines 
were achieved at what was clearly the height of an economic boom. Deficits as a 
percentage of GDP are expected to decrease during booms and increase during recessions, 
S See, for example, Reserve Bank (1994a, p. 28). Gross domestic government saving fell from 6.1% ofGDP in 1980, 
to 1.4% in 1984. Since then, it reached a high of 1.6% ofGDP in 1985, but has been negative since 1992. A 
decrease in government saving WOUld, ceteris paribus, imply a decrease in the supply ofloanable funds. The cost 
of these funds, i.e. the interest rate, would therefore be expected to increase. (Note that gross domestic government 
saving as reported here include that portion of provision for depreciation attributable to government. If this is 
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and therefore the 1995 and 1996 decreases do not necessarily indicate increased 
government commitment to fiscal discipline6. 
Movements in the key debt indicators suggest that concern over the sustainability 
of fiscal deficits is justified. In addition, because of the interrelatedness of the indicators, 
deterioration in each indicator reinforces deterioration in the others. If the debt ratio 
increases, interest costs increase. The implied increase in expenditure, unless accompanied 
by an increase in taxation, would cause an increase in the size of the deficit, which in tum 
increases the size of debt. 
Although the increasing debt ratios and interest costs ratios and the high 
conventional deficits suggest that the financial position of the fiscus is getting worse, they 
reveal little about when or how a debt crisis may occur. But while there is nothing in 
economic theory that places an upper limit on a sustainable debt ratio, a continually 
increasing debt ratio must inevitably lead to government insolvency. 
2.3 Conclusions 
The debt indicators presented above suggest that fiscal sustainability in South 
Africa may well be threatened by the debt stock. Interest and debt ratios have increased, 
and historically high deficits have been recorded. The possibility of a debt trap must be 
investigated, and the constraints on future fiscal policy must be identified if 
macroeconomic stability is to be maintained. 
The debt indicators themselves do not answer the questions on debt sustainability 
introduced in chapter 1: they merely suggest that these questions are relevant. To answer 
the questions concerning sustainability, it is not the indicators of government solvency, but 
government solvency itself that must be considered. The analysis cannot be limited to the 
popular indicators of solvency; it must investigate whether government is obeying its 
budget constraint. 
6 In addition, these decreases in the deficit were part due to some imaginative accounting. Discount costs increased 
dramatically in 1995 and 1996, with the result that the deficit may have been understated by up to 1% (Biggs, 
1995). In addition, revenue in 1996 was boosted by the receipts from sales of strategic fuel stocks worth Rl,2 
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CHAPTER 3 
Fiscal Sustainability: A Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter 1, two questions were forwarded as being relevant to the issue of fiscal 
sustainability. Firstly, "Is present fiscal policy sustainable?", and secondly, "What paths 
must fiscal policy follow if sustainability is to be maintained?". The purpose of this review 
is to evaluate the methods other researchers have used to answer these questions. But to 
evaluate these methods effectively, the environment in which the debt debate takes place 
must also be considered. This review will consider the developments in literature that have 
affected this environment. Section 3.2 will trace the literature on debt culminating in the 
development of a government budget constraint, while Section 3.3 will review the 
approaches to testing this constraint. 
A consideration of the questions above contributes to the debate on fiscal 
sustainability because these questions have not been answered in the context of the South 
African fiscal situation. Section 3.4 of this chapter will consider the literature on the South 
African public debt, and will identify the limitations of the existing papers. 
3.2 The Development of the Government Budget Constraint: An Historical 
Overview 
The Great Depression and the advent of Keynesian solutions to unemployment 
provided a justification for governments to run deficits, at least in the short run. The 
increase in the levels of government debt due to both the Depression and World War II 
heightened interest in the debates around public debt. Early debates, however, revolved 
not so much around the issues of sustainability and government solvency, but rather 
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From 1937 to 1957, conventional wisdom held that " ... interest ... on internal loans 
are merely transfers from one set of people in the country to another set, so that the two 
sets together - future generations as a whole - are not burdened at all." (Pigou (1947), 
quoted in Mishan (1963». Debt, and the interest payments on debt, were seen as an intra-
generational transfer, and thus no generation as a whole could rightly be regarded as being 
burdened by the public debt. 
This view was challenged by Buchanan (1958), Bowen el al (1960), and 
Modigliani (1961). A synthesis of Buchanan and Bowen el aI's argument is as follows. 
Assume two generations, with government selling bonds to generation 1. As generation 1 
is not forced to purchase these bonds, it cannot be said to be worse off In fact, as it 
willingly engages in trade, it can be assumed to have achieved some gains from trade. 
Generation 1 then sells these bonds to Generation 2. Again, neither generation is better off 
or worse off, as the sale is voluntary. Now assume that government chooses to redeem 
these bonds while they are in the possession of generation 2. To finance the redemption, 
government raises taxes. As generation 2 is compelled to pay these taxes, they suffer an 
economic burden. 
Modigliani (1961) extended this line of reasoning by noting that, while Buchanan 
(1958) and Bowen el al (1960) were correct in their conclusions, their analysis of the debt 
burden had focused excessively on flow concepts, without paying enough attention to the 
stocks involved. Borrowing by government increases the demand for loanable funds and 
therefore increases the interest rate. Consequently, less private capital formation takes 
place. This is exacerbated by the bond holding public's perception of the bonds as net 
wealth. The increase in perceived wealth leads to increased consumption, which in tum 
implies decreased savings. Both factors contribute to decreasing the rate of capital 
formation, which decreases economic growth. Government borrowing thus decreases the 
capital stock that future generations will inherit, and can therefore be regarded as a burden 
on these future generations. 
Modigliani does, however, concede that while debt places a burden on future 
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even more than offset, in so far as the increase in the debt is accompanied by government 
expenditure which contributes to the real income of future generations" (p. 731). This 
qualification is the critical issue. Buchanan, Bowen et ai, and Modigliani all concentrated 
on the intertemporal distribution of the costs of debt. Equally important is the distribution 
of benefits that may arise from debt-financed expenditure. If government uses the deficit-
financed expenditures to initiate projects that yield a return for future generations, the 
effect of debt on future generations may be a net benefit. In fact "... even if government 
did use bond proceeds wastefully, and did retire the debt during the lifetime of future 
generations, it is not the public debt per se that is responsible for the burden but the 
wasteful spending of bond proceeds that has left no legacy for the future" (Mishan, 1963, 
p.537). 
The above review provides a context within which the issue of fiscal sustainability 
can be considered. Short term deficits can be used to stimulate aggregate demand, but 
these deficits increase the stock of debt. Debt in itself is neither a burden nor a benefit to 
future generations. Bond proceeds spent productively will increase the capital stock 
inherited by future generations, but bond proceeds spent wastefully will result in future 
generations inheriting the costs of government debt without receiving any associated 
benefits. 
The Keynesian justification for short-term deficits hinged on the notion that 
deficits affect aggregate demand. BaITo (1974) challenged this view, asserting that rational 
individuals who cared about the utility of future generations would perceive the deficit as 
postponed taxation, and would increase savings by the amount of the deficit to meet the 
future tax burden. As a result, aggregate demand would be unaffected by deficit spending. 
This notion that taxes and debt have exactly the same aggregate demand effects was first 
suggested by David Ricardo, and is known as Ricardian Equivalence. 
Does Ricardian Equivalence hold for permanent primary deficits if the rate of 
interest exceeds the economic growth rate? BaITo (1976) himself admitted that under 
these circumstances, the Ricardian Equivalence argument would break down. The growth 
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". .. the value of the outstanding stock of debt at any point in time is bounded by the 
government's collateral, which can be measured by the present value of future taxing 
capacity" (p. 343, note 2). 
In indicating the limits of Ricardian Equivalence, Barro presented a condition for 
government solvency. The stock of government debt may never exceed the present value 
of all expected future tax revenues less all expected future expenditures. This is the 
collateral constraint government faces. If tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are limited, 
and debt grows at a rate faster than the economic growth rate, the debt stock must finally 
exceed government's collateral. 
McCallum (1984) examined the problem of government solvency and, in 
particular, Barro's solvency condition. He concluded that Barro's arguments were 
unconvincing, as the collateral constraint is only relevant if the debt is actually to be 
retired. If the bond issuance policy is permanently maintained, taxes may never have to be 
collected to retire the debt. In such a case, the taxing capacity of the government is largely 
irrelevant. 
Given this stance, McCallum (1984) attempted to determine to what extent deficits 
could be financed permanently through bond issues without causing inflation. He 
concluded that, while government could run a permanent conventional deficit without 
being inflationary, permanent primary deficits would inevitably result in inflation. In 
essence, the stock of debt cannot grow at a rate faster than the interest rate. The corollary 
of this is that the present value of the future debt stock must be zero. This is the 
intertemporal budget constraint that government faces. 
An implication of McCallum's (1984) intertemporal budget constraint is that if the 
interest rate exceeds the growth rate, it is possible for government to remain solvent even 
though the debt-to-GDP ratio increases to infinity. However, McCallum himself noted that 
as debt increases as a percentage of GDP, government has an increasing incentive to 
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In addition, for McCallum's assertion that debt can grow consistently at a rate 
faster than economic growth to hold, growth in taxes must also exceed growth in GDP. 
The logical implication is that tax revenues will eventually exceed GDP. This implies that 
government are able to tax households by an amount that exceeds the value of their 
output. While this is possible, given that household incomes include interest payments 
from government, in practice the high tax rate on interest income may decrease the public 
demand for government bonds. Obeying McCallum's intertemporal budget constraint can 
be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition for government solvency. In effect, 
Barro's (1976) collateral constraint remains relevant for the purposes of our analysis. 
3.3 Testing the Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
The seminal article for devising tests on the intertemporal budget constraint to 
determine fiscal policy sustainability was authored by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). By 
manipulating government's budget identity, they showed that if the deficit relative to GDP 
followed a stationary process, the intertemporal budget constraint was satisfied. In 
addition, they showed that government's intertemporal budget constraint was 
mathematically equivalent to the models for speculative bubbles developed by Flood and 
Garber (1980). Both the generalised and restricted Flood-Garber tests and the Dickey-
Fuller tests for stationarity were applied to the government deficit, adjusted for interest 
payments and various off-balance sheet items. On the basis of these tests, they concluded 
that the deficit followed a stationary path, and therefore US fiscal policy from 1962 to 
1984 was consistent with the government's intertemporal budget constraint. 
Wilcox (1989) extended Hamilton and Flavin's work by allowing for stochastic 
real interest rates and non-stationarity in the primary surplus. (Hamilton and Flavin 
assumed a constant real interest rate, and a stationary primary surplus). Wilcox 
constructed a test for sustainability based on the values of debt (as opposed to deficits), 
discounted back to a particular point of reference. The Dickey-Fuller test was then applied 
to these discounted values. Wilcox concluded that while fiscal policy was sustainable until 
1974, post-1974 movements in US debt and deficits suggested that government's budget 
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similar testing procedures to the Italian economy, and also find evidence there of a shift in 
fiscal policy stance. 
Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991) changed the direction of the tests, focusing not on 
debts and deficits but rather on the relationship between government revenue and 
expenditure. They showed that if a linear combination of revenue and expenditure was 
stationary, the intertemporal budget constraint was satisfied. The assumption of a constant 
expected real interest rate was maintained. Hakkio and Rush (1991) extended this work by 
allowing for a stationary real interest rate, and by using different sample periods to test the 
hypothesis that conventional deficits have become unsustainable only in recent years. By 
performing cointegration tests on the relationship between revenue and expenditure, they 
confirmed Wilcox's conclusion that recent budget deficits have not been sustainable. This 
approach has since been applied under varying circumstances by, among others, Sawada 
(1994) and Haug (1995). 
A weakness in this approach, highlighted by Kremers (1989), Haug (1995) and 
Spaventa (1988), is that obeying the intertemporal budget constraint can be consistent 
with a debt-to-GDP ratio tending towards infinity. This is implausible, and highlights a 
requirement mentioned by Barro (1976), that government debt must remain within the 
limits of government collateral. If government has no marketable assets, the present value 
of government debt must remain bounded by the difference between the present value of 
all future government revenues and the present value of all future non-interest government 
expenditure. In effect, obeying the intertemporal budget constraint is merely a necessary 
and not a sufficient condition for government solvency. While McCallum's critique of the 
collateral constraint is accepted on theoretical grounds, the increased incentive for 
government to default on the debt and the high tax rates on interest income necessary to 
maintain solvency will render the situation untenable for all practical purposes. 
While a number of researchers have made reference to the collateral constraint 
(Barro (1976), Spaventa (1988), Kremers (1993), Haug (1995», none has attempted to 
apply it to future fiscal policy. Whether or not the collateral constraint is obeyed depends 
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The weakness of the research is that, because of the nature of the approach, the 
paper yields no definite conclusion about whether or not South Africa is in a debt trap, or 
what should be done to ensure that a debt trap is avoided. In addition, the section on 
forecasting future debt-to-GDP ratios is weak, because the assumptions made on 
expenditure movements are simplistic. 
The second paper by Roux (1993) concentrates on the calculus of the debt-to-
GDP ratio in order to identify the factors that cause this ratio to change. It is shown that 
DtNt - Dt-1Nt-1 = [(rt-gt)/(I+gt)](Dt-1N t-1) - BtNt + RJYt 
where 
D = outstanding debt at the end of period t, 
Y=GDP, 
r = the interest rate, 
g = the GDP growth rate, 
B = the primary balance, and 
R = a residual included to accommodate changes in off-balance sheet items 
The off-balance sheet items in R include changes in the value of government assets 
and movements in the exchange rates. Clearly, changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio are 
positively related to the interest rate/growth rate differential and are negatively related to 
the primary balance. 
Roux highlights the important point that while historically in South Africa growth 
rates have exceeded interest rates, this is no longer the case. Much of the current concern 
over the debt situation stems from the positive interest/growth differential. 
Movements in the debt-to-GDP ratio are outlined for a variety of expenditure, tax 
and GDP paths. Once again, due to the nature of the approach, very little is said about 
which of these paths are sustainable. Roux does, however, highlight the importance of 
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The most recent work on the debt situation is ABSA (1996). This paper also 
concentrates on the fiscal calculus surrounding the debt-to-GOP ratio, but the ratio 
analysis is developed far beyond that ofRoux's. The two major contributions of the paper 
are the development of a steady state debt-to-GOP ratio when growth exceeds the interest 
rate, and the identification of a threshold primary surplus that will prevent an explosion of 
the debt ratio in the event of the interest rate exceeding the growth rate. 
ABSA shows that, when the growth/interest differential is positive, the steady state 
debt ratio equals 
(debt/GOP) = q(l+y)l(y-r) 
where 
q = the primary deficit, 
y = the GOP growth rate, and 
r = the interest rate. 
ABSA then calculates the limit to the debt-to-GOP ratio (which is the steady state 
ratio) for every year from 1986 to 1996. Their findings are shown in Table 3.1. The steady 
state debt-to-GOP ratio is very sensitive to changes in the interest rate and the growth 
rate. In addition, this analysis is only relevant if the growth/interest differential is positive. 
ABSA claims that the differential was positive in South Africa for every financial year 
except for 1993. The interest rate on government debt was estimated 13% for 1996, while 
GOP growth was estimated 13.5%. The interest and growth rate figures quoted suggest 
that the debt ratio will tend towards a steady state value of 31. 8%. 
The 13% interest rate for 1996 was an underestimate, and the 13.5% growth was 
an overestimate. GOP growth for the financial year ending 31 March 1996 was 11.2%7. 
Replacing 13.5% with 11.2% in the steady state equation yields a debt ratio that increases 
to infinity. 
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Table 3.1 Expected steady-state Debt-to-GDP Ratios for South Africa: 1986 - 1996 
ABSA Debt Projections (Source: ABSA, 1996) 
yearl DeficitlGDP Interest Rate GDPGrowth Limie 
1986 0.11 12.2% 13.7% 8.3 
1987 0.80 12.3% 18.2% 16.0 
1988 2.42 11.8% 16.7% 57.6 
1989 1.37 11.7% 20.5% 18.8 
1990 -1.47 12.0% 18.7% -00 
1991 -0.63 11.9% 14.1% -00 
1992 0.96 12.3% 12.8% 216.6 
1993 4.60 12.9% 8.6% +00 
1994 4.92 13.1% 13.7% 932.3 
1995 1.11 12.1% 12.7% 208.5 
1996 0.14 13.0% 13.5% 31.8 
Notes: 1. Year ended 31 March 
2. The steady-state debt ratio 
The interest rate of 13% was calculated by dividing total interest payments by the 
value of the state debt. Of the R280 billion of total government debt, R245 billion is made 
up of domestic marketable government stock. Of this, less than Rl billion was issued 
before 1982. Since 1982, the average interest rate on 0 to 3 year stock has been 14.2%, 
and on 10 year and over stock 15.4%. All other stock had yields between these two 
extreme points. It is therefore improbable that true interest costs as a percentage of total 
debt was 13%. 
The error could have occurred for two reasons. Firstly, ABSA correctly tries to 
include discount costs as part of total interest costs, but does so by writing off the 
discount costs over ten years. If discounted bonds were on average of a shorter term, 
writing off discount costs over ten years would underestimate the true total interest billS. 
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While the current accounting treatment of discount costs understates the size of 
the fiscal deficit, it also overstates total government debt. In the year government stock is 
issued, discounted bonds should be included in total debt at the amount they were issued 
for, and not at their coupon value. They are currently included at coupon value, and the 
obvious distortion arises. 
Because of government's treatment of discount costs, ABSA divides 
underestimated interest costs by an overestimated total debt. The result is a vastly 
underestimated interest rate on government debt. 
As stated earlier, given the current growth rate, interest rate and primary deficit, 
ABSA calculated the steady state debt ratio as being 31.8%. But even if ABSA's growth 
and interest estimates were only slightly out, such that the true growth rate was 13.3% 
and the true interest rate was 13.2% (as opposed to the estimated 13.5% and 13% 
proposed by ABSA), the steady state debt ratio would become 140%. 
The steady state approach is instructive in that it gives one some idea of the limits 
to future debt ratio movements. The approach is, however, very sensitive to errors in 
interest and growth rate estimation. In addition, the reality in South Africa at present is 
that the real interest rate exceeds the real economic growth rate, so that the approach is 
not applicable to the South African debt situation. 
By contrast, the threshold primary surplus approach may be worth pursuing in the 
South African context. However, because ABSA estimated the growth/interest differential 
to be positive, the threshold level was not calculated. 
In summary, the South African debt literature provides extensive coverage of 
government solvency indicators, and how these have moved over the last two decades. 
But no attempt is made to determine whether or not South Africa is in a debt trap, or 
whether or not past fiscal policies are sustainable. Neither has any attempt been made to 
outline expenditure and revenue paths that will ensure the sustainability of future fiscal 
policies. The questions asked at the beginning of this chapter (i.e. Is fiscal policy 
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been answered in the South African context. Approaches to testing government solvency 
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CHAPTER 4 
Government Solvency: Testing the Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
4.1 Introduction 
The level of public debt is cause for concern if under the present fiscal stance it 
leads to government insolvency. Maintaining the fiscal stance would necessitate printing 
money to finance deficits, which would lead to inflation and macroeconomic instability. If 
present fiscal policy is sustainable, then no fiscal restructuring is necessary for government 
to avoid the debt trap. But if present fiscal policy is not sustainable, government must 
restructure spending and revenue plans to avoid the macroeconomic instability that 
government insolvency would cause. 
A method for assessing the sustainability of past fiscal policy is to consider 
government's intertemporal budget constraint. This method is introduced and discussed in 
Section 3.3. The approach was pioneered by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), and has since 
been adapted and employed by a number of other researchers. 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) showed that government's intertemporal budget 
constraint is satisfied if the deficit can be shown to follow a stationary process. Wilcox 
(1987) extended this work to allow for stochastic variation in real interest rates, and 
Baglioni and Cherubini (1993) applied this approach in analysing the sustainability of 
Italian fiscal policy. 
Trehan and Walsh (1991), Haug (1995), Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Sawada 
(1994) take a slightly different approach. They show that government satisfies the 
intertemporal budget constraint if spending and revenue trends are cointegrated. This 
chapter applies the approach favoured by Hakkio and Rush (1991), which allows for 
fluctuations in the real interest rate and which looks at fiscal policy over various periods to 
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The justification for taking such an approach rests on the conjecture that the forces 
driving movements in taxation and expenditure have changed, with the result that the 
stable long term relationship between the two series has broken down. In the past, 
increases in government expenditure were accommodated by increases in taxation revenue 
through fiscal drag or by increases in the rate of GST or VAT. There may, however, be a 
limit to the amount of tax revenue that can be raised under a specific tax regime. Increased 
tax rates may decrease incentive to work. Even if hours worked are insensitive to changes 
in tax rates, increased taxes may decrease the intensity of work effort, or decrease the 
amount of reported taxable income earned9• Flight of capital and skills could also occur. 
Finally, if taxes are perceived to be unfairly high, as seems to be the case in South Africa, 
tax morality is undermined, and tax avoidance and tax evasion increase. These factors 
combine to put a ceiling on the total tax revenue that can be raised without radical changes 
to the tax system. Once this ceiling is reached, additional tax revenue can only be raised 
through economic growth. 
The idea that there is a Laffer relationship between tax rates and total tax revenues 
means that there is an optimal tax rate at which tax revenue is maximised. Previously, 
increases in government spending could be funded by increases in tax revenue. If, 
however, the maximum level of tax revenue has been reached, additional tax revenue can 
no longer be raised to fund additional expenditure. If expenditure continues to increase 
and tax revenue is unable to follow suit, the stable long term relationship between 
government revenue and exp nditure will be broken. Increases in expenditure will outpace 
increases in revenue, and unless checked, fiscal insolvency must inevitably result. 
This chapter tests, within the context of an intertemporal budget constraint, 
whether the stable relationship between expenditure and revenue has been broken. Section 
4.2 examines the government's budget constraint as outlined by Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986). Section 4.3 considers the adjustments made by Hakkio and Rush (1991) to derive 
a testable equation, and Section 4.4 briefly discusses the technique of cointegration. 
9 Feldstein (1993) fOWld evidence that reported taxable income in the USA varied significantly with changes in 
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Section 4.5 lists the sources of data and provides the empirical results, while Section 4.6 
discusses the results and considers the policy implications these results might have. 
Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
The government's one-period budget identity for period 't' is 
where 'G' is government spending on goods and services and transfers, 'R' is government 
revenue, 'B' is the value of the public debt outstanding, and 'i' is the interest rate. The 
debt in year '1' is equal to the difference between spending and revenue for year 't', plus 
the sum of the outstanding debt and the interest costs thereon. Note that 'G' does not 
include interest payments on government debt: these are included in the term (1 +it)Bt-1. 
Taking the first difference of this equation and manipulating, we get 
Returning to equation (1), solving forward1o yields 
where 
00 





In other words, the present stock of debt is equal to the sum of the present value 
of future primary surpluses plus the present value of the stock of debt in year 'n'. Note 
that (1) is merely an identity, and that (2) is derived directly from (l). Therefore (2) holds 
regardless of the state of government finance. As Hamilton and Flavin (1986) indicate, 
"Equation (1) and its implication equation (2) can hardly be a point of serious controversy, 
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for they do little more than summarise the definitions of monetary and fiscal policy." 
(p.811). 
To develop an intertemporal budget constraint for government, equation (2) has to 
be examined in more depth. The government would be solvent if the present stock of 
government debt were equal to the present value of all future primary surpluses. In other 
words, government is solvent if 
co 
(3) Bo = L n(RI - G) 
1=\ 
Looking at (2), it is clear that this will only be the case if 
If the left hand side of (4) is greater than zero, then the debt stock would be 
greater than the present value of future expected repayments, implying that government is 
redeeming old bonds simply through the issue of new bonds. Government would therefore 
be playing Ponzi gamesll. 
Note that the intertemporal budget constraint does not require the debt to decrease 
to zero, it merely requires that the present value of the debt tends to zero. In other words, 
debt can be increasing continually, so long as the rate of increase is lower than the rate of 
interest. This implies that while governments cannot run primary deficits indefinitely, 
continued conventional deficits can be consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. 
If government spending and revenue continue to follow the historical processes 
that they have in South Africa, is it expected that lim rnBn = 0 (as 'n' tends to infinity)? 
This is the question that Hakkio and Rush (1991) attempt to answer in their evaluation of 
the United States' fiscal position. To do this, they manipulate (2) to produce an hypothesis 
that can be tested using the technique of cointegration. Their methodology is discussed 
next. 
11 Charles Ponzi was a New Yorker who lead an extravagant lifestyle by simply increasing his borrowing to repay his 
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4.3 Developing a Testable Hypothesis 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) assume a stationary interest rate with a mean equal to 'i'. 
Then (1) can be rewritten to obtain 
where Et = Gt + (it-i)Bt-t. In other words, Et includes all expenditures on goods and 
services plus interest costs to the extent that the current interest rate exceeds the mean 
interest rate. Solving forward as we did with equation (2) yields 
00 
(6) Bt-I=Lrj+l(Rt+j-Gt+j) + limrj+lBt+j 
j=O j-+oo 
Taking the first difference of(5) yields 
(Sa) Lillt = (1+i)Lillt-t +AEt -.1Rt 
Solving equation (Sa) forward12, we get 
00 
(7) Lillt = L rj + I(ARt + j + 1 - Lllit + j + I) + lim rj + lLillt + j 
j=O j-+oo 
Substituting (la) into (7) yields 
00 
(8) Gt+itBt-t=Rt+ Lrj+I(ARt+j+I-Lllit+j+l) + limrj+lLillt+j 
j=O j-+oo 
The left hand side of (8) equals the sum of government spending on transfers, 
goods and services, and interest costs. This sum is equal to total government spending (as 
opposed to non-interest government spending), and will be represented by GG from now 
on. 
Now assume that Rand E are stochastic, non-stationary 1(1) processes such that 
AR and ~ are stationary. Hakkio and Rush (1991) assume that both series are random 
walks with drift. i.e. 
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Then (8) can be rewritten as 
(9) GGt = Itt + a + lim rj + 1M3t + j + Et 
j~C() 
For solvency to hold, the limit of rj+l as 'j' tends to infinity must equal zero. If 
solvency holds, the equation can be rewritten as 
If R and GG are 1(1) processes, then GG and R must be cointegrated for the 
government to be solvent. If Et is not stationary, then the value of the limit term in (9) is 
not zero13. The present value of future debt stock is positive, and the expected future 
government surpluses (based on the historical movements of taxes and spending) will not 
be sufficient to redeem the debt. 
A further condition that Hakkio and Rush (1991) categorise as being "probably 
necessary" for solvency is b = 1. While they show that fulfilling this condition is not 
necessary for solvency in the strictest sense, b < 1 would mean that the undiscounted value 
of debt tends to infinity. In such a case, the government may struggle to market its debt, 
and the incentive for government to default on the debt would increase. 14 
In summary then, (10) is tested to check i) whether Et is stationary, and ii) whether 
b = 1. If Et is stationary, then the discounted value of future debt is indeed zero, and the 
current stock of debt is equal to present value of future expected primary surpluses. If b < 
1, although the country may be solvent in the strictest sense, the increasing nominal value 
of the debt may cause investors to expect government to default on its debt. Government 
13 Note that changes in the present value of future debt tending to zero is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
solvency. The present value of future debt could be a positive constant. Then changes in the present value are zero, 
even though government is insolvent. 
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might then be unable to raise further debt finance. Condition i) is necessary for solvency, 
while condition ii) merely warns of possible debt marketing problems in the future. 
4.4 Co integration 
A brief discussion of cointegration is appropriate here, and such a discussion must 
necessarily start with the concept of stationarity. A series is stationary when it has a 
constant mean and variance that are independent of time. In other words, a stationary 
series always tends to return to its mean value, and the fluctuations around this mean are 
of a constant magnitude. An example of a stationary series would be Yt = 0.5Yt-l + 8t, 
where 8 is independently identically distributed, with a mean of zero. In this case, Y t 
would also fluctuate around a mean of zero. More generally, the series Yt = pYt- l + 8t is 
stationary for all p such that I pi < 1. 
If P = 1, then Yt is a non-stationary random walk series. Such a series has no 
tendency to revert to its mean value. In fact the concept of a mean is inappropriate when 
referring to a non-stationary process, as the mean changes continually over time. 
A non-stationary variable can become stationary if it is differenced, and the number 
of times it must be differenced to achieve stationarity depends on the number of unit roots 
it containsl5 . A series that needs to be differenced three times before it becomes stationary 
has three unit roots, and is denoted as an 1(3) process, while a stationary process is 
denoted as an 1(0) process. 
If two series follow random walk processes and are 1(1), then generally any linear 
combination of these two variables will also be 1(1). However, it may be possible that two 
series have a stable long term relationship, and even though both series are random walks, 
the difference between the two series is stable. In other words, even though the two series 
contain a number of stochastic trends, they always move together. Thus a linear 
combination of these two 1(1) processes may yield a stationary 1(0) residual. If this is the 
case, then these two series are cointegrated. 
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In the context of this paper, we would expect that taxes and government spending 
each follow random walks. For fiscal policy to be sustainable, however, there must be a 
stable long term relationship between the two. If taxes and government spending move 
independently of each other, there is no reason why they should not move infinitely far 
apart in the long run. This would imply infinite deficits and fiscal crisis. In short, while 
taxes and government spending might be I( 1) processes, sustainability requires a linear 
combination of the two to produce an 1(0) process. 
Cointegration will be tested for using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. It was 
shown earlier that 
Yt = pYt-1 + Et 
is stationary for all p such that I pi < 1. Subtracting Yt- l from both sides yields 
~Yt = (p-l)Yt-1 + Et 
In the simplest form of the Dickey Fuller test, the null hypothesis that p = 1 and Yt 
is non-stationary is tested against the alternative hypothesis that p < 1 and Yt is stationary. 
Such a test would only be appropriate if the overall mean of the series is zero. This is 
obviously not the case when one is testing series such as government spending and taxes, 
and thus an intercept term is included. The appropriate Dickey-Fuller test is 
~Yt = at + (p-l)Yt-1 + Et 
In such a test, ~ Yt is being tested only against Yt- l . This assumes that Yt is an 
AR(I) procedure. If Yt actually follows an AR(n) process with n > 1, then the simple 
Dickey-Fuller would no longer be appropriate, as it might incorrectly reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test includes lagged values 
of ~ Yt in the regression in order to correct for this shortcoming. The selection of an 
appropriate number oflags is important, for as Harris (1995) points out, " ... too few lags 
results in over rejecting the null hypothesis, while too many lags may reduce the power of 
the test" (p. 47). The power is reduced because of the decreased number of observations 
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The Augmented Dickey Fuller is used for all stationarity tests documented in the 
rest of this chapter. 
4.5 Data Sources and Empirical Evidence 
The tests were done using Quarterly data on the Exchequer Account from the 
South African Reserve Bank Database SARB94. Total Exchequer Receipts (series 
4045M) was used for government revenue, and the sum of Departmental Issues, Other 
Issues and Cash Flow Adjustments was used for government expenditure (series 4049M). 
Revenues and Expenditures of the former TBVC countries are included in the data. When 
discount costs were included to achieve a more meaningful expenditure series, the data 
were also obtained from the SARB94 database. The discount costs were included as if 
these costs were written off on an accrual basis, assuming that all bonds had a life of ten 
years. It was necessary to make this estimate, as more detailed information on discount 
costs is not available from the Reserve Bank. 
A key assumption of the testable budget constraint is that the interest rate is 
stationary. This assumption would be inappropriate if one were to consider the nominal 
interest rate, but the real interest rate could be expected to follow a stationary path. For 
this reason, all variables used in the tests are real. All variables obtained in nominal form 
were divided by the GDP deflator. 
As was outlined in the previous two sections, the analysis must begin by testing 
whether government spending and government revenue behave in the expected manner. In 
other words, are revenue and spending 1(1) processes? (i.e. Are both series non-stationary, 
while the first differences of both series are stationary?) These tests were done for the full 
period (1960: 1 to 1994:4), the hundred observation period (1970: 1 to 1994:4) the sixty 
observation period (1980:1 to 1994:4) and the fifty observation period (1982:3 to 
1994:4). In all cases the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test with four lags was used. The 
results are recorded in Table 4.1 below. 
As hypothesised, the series are non-stationary at levels (non-stationarity cannot be 
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The exception to this rule is the first difference of revenue for the last 50 periods (1982:3 
to 1994:4), which cannot be shown to be stationary, even at the 10% level. A look at real 
expenditure and real revenue for the period under study is informative. 
The conjecture mentioned in the introduction, that the relationship between 
government spending and revenue is weakening, is vindicated by figure 4.1. Government 
spending has continued to increase as a percentage of GDP, but since 1990 increases in 
tax revenue have not kept pace. Even in 1994 and 1995, periods of relative economic 
boom, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are lower than the levels they reached in 
1990. 




















































1. The Null Hypothesis is that the series is non-stationary. Values in this colwnn indicate at what significance level 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. 'N' implies that the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 10% leve1. 
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The second difference of total receipts since 1982 is stationary at the 1 % level. 
Total Receipts is thus an 1(2) process for the fifty observation period, and testing for 
cointegration between two series of differing order of integration would be incorrect. It is 
impossible that they move together. Testing confirms this, total payments and total 
receipts are not cointegrated, even at the 10% level of testing. 
Figure 4.1. Government Expenditure and Taxes as a 








1980 1982 1984 
Source: South African Quarterly Bulletin 
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
Year 
This result is sufficient cause for concern. Since the third quarter of 1982, spending 
and revenue have not moved together. It follows that the present value of future debt 
stock is positive. If government spending and revenue are expected to follow historical 
processes, then government is technically insolvent. 
It can be argued that 121/2 years is not long enough to be considered long term, 
and that perhaps the series involved return very slowly to the mean. Therefore, it may still 
be worth testing for cointegration over longer periods. This argument is supported by the 
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level. Consequently, tests for cointegration were performed on spending and revenue for 
the periods 1960:1 to 1994:4, 1970:1 to 1994:4 (100 obs), and 1980:1 to 1994:4 (60 obs). 
To ensure that the results achieved were not due to some statistical anomaly 
caused by the shortening of the time period, the period was halved. Spending and revenue 
were tested for cointegration for the periods 1960:1 to 1977:4 and 1978:1 to 1994:4. 
Since four lags were used, each period contains an equal number of observations. Any 
difference in results must reflect on the changing degree of solvency of the fiscal position. 
The results of the cointegration tests are tabled below. As the tests were on the Et 
term in (10), the residual was tested for stationarity assuming no trend or intercept 
component. 
Table 4.2. Cointegration Test Results: Expenditure and Revenue, 
South Africa, 1960 - 1994 
Results of Cointe&ration Tests 
No. of Observations ADF Statistic Critical b Estimates 
Value 
Whole Period (}960:1 -1994:41 -3.182 1% 0.804 
100 Observations (}970:1 -1994:41 -2.598 1% 0.764 
60 Observations (}980:1 -1994:41 -1.916 10% 0.534 
1st Hall (}960:1 -1977:41 -2.683 1% 0.690 
2ndHall(}978:1 -1994:41 -2.390 5% 0.615 
Since 1980, non-cointegration between spending and revenue can only be rejected 
at the 10% level. As 5% significance level is normally considered appropriate in these 
circumstances, the relationship between spending and revenue has not been stable since 
1980. 
As (8) showed, the correct measure of government expenditure to use in the 
cointegration tests includes the costs of bond financing. But the costs of bond financing 
include both the interest paid annually, as well as the discount costs on bond issues16. An 
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estimate of the appropriate amount of discount costs to add to government expenditure 
was made by writing off these costs on an accrual basis, assuming all bonds had ten year 
maturities. These costs were added to the expenditure on the Exchequer's Account, and 
the cointegration tests were rerun. 
Table 4.3. Cointegration Tests including Discount Costs 
Results of Cointe&ration Tests 
No. of Observations ADF Statistic Critical b Estimates 
Value 
Whole Period 0960:1 -1994:4l -3.095 1% 0.790 
100 Observations 0970:1 -1994:4l -2.551 5% 0.743 
60 Observations 0980:1 -1994:4l -1.928 10% 0.515 
rt Hall 0960:1 -1977:4l -2.683 1% 0.690 
2nd Hall 0978:1 - 1994:4l -2.385 5% 0.592 
The addition of discount costs has very little effect on the stationarity measures in 
most of the periods. The increased expenditure was sufficient, however, to render the 100 
observation sample stationary at only the 5% level. In all observation periods containing 
the years 1980 to 1994, the 'b' estimates decrease. 
4.6 Analysis and Implications of the Results 
For the full period, expenditure (both including and excluding discount costs) and 
revenue are cointegrated. The long run relationship between the two series is stable, and 
the government is therefore solvent. 
For the 100 observation period, spending and revenue are still cointegrated. But 
when discount costs are added to total expenditure, the series are only cointegrated at the 
5% level. Government is still obeying the intertemporal budget constraint, but the 
relationship between expenditure and revenue is getting weaker. 
For the 60 observation period, the tests reject cointegration at the 5% level for 
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changed, and that the relationship between the two series is no longer stable. The residual 
term Et is not stationary, implying, from equations (8) and (10), that the present value of 
future debt stock is greater than zero. Future primary surpluses will not be sufficient to 
redeem the current stock of debt if spending and revenue continue to behave in the manner 
that they have for the last 60 quarters. 
Tests done on the first and second halves of the full period yield similar results. 
Spending and revenue are cointegrated at the 1% level for the period 1960 to 1977, but 
only at the 5% level from 1978 to 1994. 
These results rationalise the concern that current fiscal policy, if continued, 
violates government's intertemporal budget constraint. Expenditure inclusive of discount 
costs and revenue are cointegrated at the 1% level for the period 1960 to 1994, at the 5% 
level for the period 1970 to 1994, and at the 10% level for the period 1980 to 1994. The 
5% level is normally regarded as the appropriate significance level for this type of testing, 
and thus spending and revenue are not cointegrated from 1980 onwards. For the fifty 
observation period (from 1982:3 to 1994:4), spending and revenue are ofa different order 
of integration, and are consequently not cointegrated at any level. 
These results support the conclusions that one can draw from Figure 4. 1. From 
about 1985, revenue has been driven by forces independent of the spending needs of the 
government. From 1990, real tax revenue has fluctuated around a relatively constant 
mean. This suggests that tax revenues may have reached a ceiling, and can only be 
increased under the present tax structure by strong economic growth. Increases in real 
expenditure have, however, continued unchecked. This may be due to attempts to reduce 
the social spending backlog in certain communities by providing basic social services. 
Whatever the cause, it appears spending has grown without due regard to how the 
revenue is to be raised. The result is a fiscal position that is unsustainable. 
4.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The nature of the cointegration technique is such that it draws conclusions about 
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about the future that is not included in the historical record. For example, if government 
were committed, through the constitution, to paying out an amount equal to 10% of GDP 
annually from 1997 until 2010 to previously disadvantaged communities, government 
solvency would be seriously affected. However, as such payments would occur in the 
future, such an agreement would not affect the estimate of government solvency using 
cointegration. This is a weakness of co integration testing, and implies that our results may 
be incorrect if there is anything likely to affect future government spending and revenue 
that is not mirrored in the past. 
One such factor may be economic growth. Figure 1 shows that the period during 
which government spending and revenue diverged most noticeably was from 1985 to 
1994. This period was characterised by slow economic growth, and a mounting imperative 
for government to spend on social services. If the rate of economic growth is expected to 
be higher in the future, tax revenues can also be expected to increase. That being the case, 
there might be no reason to arrest the increases in real government expenditure, for if 
revenue is expected to increase apace, the long term stable relationship between 
expenditure and revenue may be restored. 
Support for this argument comes in the form of predicted economic growth for 
1996 of 3.5%17, which is only marginally lower than the average growth of real 
government spending for the same period of 3.7%. If, for example, a slightly higher 
economic growth rate of 4% can be sustained, and if this growth translates into a 4% 
increase in tax revenues, the present fiscal position may yet be sustainable without fiscal 
restructuring. 
Two counter factors suggest that this might not be the case. Firstly, the 3.5% 
economic growth expected for 1996 is being achieved at the height of an economic 
boom18. Unless a macroeconomic growth strategy is implemented successfully, it would be 
unrealistic to expect GDP growth of3.5% to be sustained. 
17 Department of Finance, (1996) "Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy", p.7. 
Hereafter referred to as GEAR. 
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Secondly, the decrease in the rate of inflation has resulted in a high real interest 
rate of about 7%. The real costs of government borrowing have consequently increased, 
and this will increase real government expenditure. Nominal interest rates could fall, 
reducing the real interest rates to sustainable levels. However, the as yet unredeemed long 
government stock was issued at nominal interest rates of at least 15%, and thus 
government will continue to pay high servicing costs on its debt, regardless of changes in 
current nominal interest rates. Even though short-term interest rates may fluctuate, the 
interest rate on government debt will remain at its present level for some time. Sustained 
high real interest rates on government debt mean that, all else being equal, government 
spending will increase. 
Unless higher economic growth is achieved, tax revenues will not grow apace with 
expenditures. Given that expenditures are expected to increase further because of higher 
real interest rates, no factor in the near future, not accounted for in the past, will improve 
the solvency of South Africa's fiscal position19. South Africa's fiscal policy is 
unsustainable based on past behaviour. If current policies are continued in the absence of 
higher GDP growth, this position of insolvency will not change. What is required IS a 
drastic restructuring offiscal policy. 
What are the policy options? Obviously, either expenditure must be reduced or 
government revenue must be increased. But the current literature suggests that very little 
extra revenue will be obtained from increasing already high tax rates20, and reducing 
19 Government could earn additional revenues in the future by privatising state assets, and the effect this has on 
government's budget constraint will be examined in chapter 5. Privatisation is not discussed here because, due to 
the limited nwnber of state assets, assets sales cannot be considered a sustainable revenue source. 
20 Fallon and Pereira da Silva (1994) state that "Not much can be done to increase revenue as a share ofGDP .... 
Further tax evasion and possibly increased emigration may result if attempts are made to raise the top rates of 
personal income tax" (p. Ill). This view is supported by IMF (1992), but disputed by Zarenda (1992) and Harber 
(1995). However, Zarenda provides no empirical support for his argwnents, and his main suggestions for 
increasing tax revenues are economic growth and improved collection efficiency (pp. 6-7), and he does not 
advocate an increase in tax rates. Harber (1995, p.30) employs regression analysis on the variables real per capita 
GNP, Industrial share of GNP, Trade share of GNP, dummy variables for each region, and an intercept term. Of 
the 8 variables used, only 2 are significant at the 5% level (one of which is the intercept term). An R2 of23.4% is 
achieved, and no attempt is made to test for heteroskedacticity. On the basis of the regression he concludes that 
South Africa is undertaxed. Harber provides no justification for the variables he chooses. One notable omission is 
the Gini-Coefficient, or some other measure of income distribution. South Africa's Gini-Coefficient is high, and if 
it were included, the regression could very possibly show South Africa to be overtaxed. He also provides no 
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government expenditure may be infeasible in the light of the country's social service needs. 
Three directions for policy present themselves as potential solutions. 
Firstly, government expenditure can be reduced without reducing the quantity or 
quality of government services provided. This would involve more efficient and more 
rational use of resources, and a decrease in resource wastage. Obviously all governments 
aim to do this, and the task is not an easy one. Employing budget techniques that relate 
inputs to outputs could increase the efficiency of government expenditure on a 
microeconomic scale. 
Secondly, tax revenue can be increased by more efficient tax collection. Increasing 
collection efficiency would increase tax revenue without raising tax rates. Improved tax 
collection could raise the ceiling on tax revenues. This option is already being 
implemented. The South African Revenue Service has estimated that an additional R1,5 
billion (Budget Review, 1996, p. 5.11) will be collected during the 1996/97 financial year 
because of improved collection methods. 
Finally, tax revenue can be increased indirectly by spending on activities that 
enhance economic growth. Increased growth would increase revenue without affecting 
government spending. 
This list of potential solutions to the fiscal problems is not comprehensive, nor is it 
certain that such steps are feasible and able to be implemented. The list merely indicates 
the sort of solution that must be implemented if fiscal crisis is to be avetted. The evidence 
shows clearly that spending and revenue are no longer cointegrated. Spending appears to 
be driven by the need to provide social services to the poor, while revenue is constrained 
by the already heavy tax burden on the upper and middle income groups. The stable long 
term relationship between revenue and spending has grown progressively weaker, and the 
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CHAPTERS 
The Collateral Constraint and Fiscal Sustainability 
5.1 Introduction 
The fiscal stance taken by the South African government SInce 1982 is 
unsustainable. This was shown clearly in the last chapter. But while the cointegration tests 
can adequately answer questions about past policies, they can tell us very little about 
future policies. The importance of public debt is that it casts doubt on the solvency of 
government. From a policy perspective, it is essential to indicate what paths fiscal policy 
should follow if government solvency is to be maintained. 
This chapter will identify the upper bounds to the growth of government 
expenditure if fiscal policy is to be sustainable, given various future growth and interest 
rates. To do so, the differences between the intertemporal budget constraint and the 
collateral constraint must be made clear. 
The intertemporal budget constraint was identified in chapter 3 as being: 
00 
Bo = L n(Rt - Gt) + lim rnBn 
t=\ 
The budget constraint is satisfied if the second term on the right hand side of the equation 
is equal to zero. In other words, if the government debt is increasing at a rate lower than 
the interest rate, the government is solvent. 
This constraint is satisfied if government consistently runs primary surpluses in 
present value terms, regardless of the size of the conventional deficit. With a balanced 
primary budget, government debt will increase at the interest rate. A primary surplus thus 
ensures that debt grows at a rate slower than the interest rate. 21 
2\ This holds only if the present value of these surpluses exceeds zero. If the present value of future surpluses tends to 
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But consider the case where the interest rate exceeds the GDP growth rate22. 
Government debt may grow at a rate d which is slower than the interest rate (i), but faster 
than the economic growth rate (Y), such that 
i> d> y 
Thus even though the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied, debt is growing faster 
than GDP, and the debt-to-GDP ratio tends to infinity. Is this a solvent position? 
Under these circumstances, solvency depends on government collateral. 
Government's collateral is the sum of its assets and the present value of all future revenues 
adjusted for essential non-interest spending. If the present level of government debt 
exceeds the present value of government's collateral, then government is insolvent, 
regardless of future movements in taxes and expenditure. The limitations to government 
collateral mean that a continually increasing debt-to-GDP ratio implies that government is 
insolvent. Therefore movements of government debt could satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constraint presented above, without satisfying the requirement that debt remain 
within the limits of government collateral. 
Kremers (1989) argued that debt may exceed collateral because taxes are limited 
as a percentage of GDP. When this limit is reached, tax revenue can grow at most at a rate 
equal to the growth rate ofGDP (y)?3 If debt grows at a rate faster thany, debt will finally 
exceed government collateral, and the government will be insolvent. For debt to remain 
within the limits of government collateral, growth of debt must not permanently exceed 
the growth in tax revenues. In terms of our notation, d cannot exceed y permanently. 
If i > y, then satisfying the intertemporal budget identity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for solvency. The sufficient condition for solvency is that d does not 
rate. The present value of govenunent debt will therefore be constant, but positive. Govenunent will therefore not 
be solvent. 
22 Most studies on this subject assume that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. Fischer and Easterly (1990), for 
one, agree that " ... market forces tend to prevent the real interest rate from remaining below the real growth rate 
permanently. The normal situation should be thought of as one in which the real interest rate exceeds the growth 
rate." (P. 136) 
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exceed y permanently. In other words, a permanently increasing debt-to-GDP ratio is not 
consistent with government solvency. 
This theoretical formulation justifies the concern about the dramatic increase in 
South Africa's debt-to-GDP ratio over the last decade. The previous chapter showed that 
South African fiscal policy over the last ten years has not been consistent with the 
intertemporal budget constraint. This chapter will outline options for government 
expenditure growth under various scenarios, given the collateral constraint. It must be 
stressed that the expenditure growth paths outlined are sustainable, but not necessarily 
optimal. These growth paths show the limits to sustainable expenditure growth. But while 
a sustainable fiscal policy path may not be optimal, an optimal fiscal policy path must be 
sustainable. Therefore the optimal path for future fiscal policy will be found within those 
paths we identify as being sustainable. 
In Section 5.2, a theoretical framework will be developed to identify sustainable 
expenditure growth paths. This framework will be applied to South Africa in Section 5.3. 
In Section 5.4, the limitations of the framework will be considered, and various attempts 
will be made to overcome these limitations. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Government Collateral and Fiscal Solvency 
Following Kremers (1989), government collateral C at time 't' is equal to 
., 
(1) Ct = rYt l:Qt,j 
j=t+l 
where r is the upper limit of taxes as a percentage of GDP, and QtJ is the relevant 
discount factor. rY is adjusted for essential non-interest expenditure. Given the goal of 




where At is the value of government assets at time t, Rt and Et are government revenue 

















Assume expected revenue growth is equal to GDP growth y, the interest rate 










Equation (3) holds only if i > Y and i > e. If i < y, then the present value of all 
expected future tax revenue is infinite, and the collateral constraint does not hold. If e > i, 
then the present value offuture expenditure is infinite, and government's collateral is zero. 
The existence of any government debt would mean that government is insolvent. These 
possible cases are ignored: the former would probably not exist for any length of time, and 
the latter is unsustainable unless the former holds. 
In addition, (3) holds only if all government revenue is received and expenditure 
made on the first day of the year. This is unrealistic. If the simplifying assumption is made 
that revenues match expenditures throughout the year, such that any surplus or deficit is 
paid out or received on the last day of the financial year, then (3) must be modified to: 




to obtain the present value of government collateral. 
Government debt may not exceed government collateral. At the limit of 
government solvency, debt equals collateral. 
where D t is government debt at the beginning of year t. 
For the moment, let us ignore government's stock of assets. If government has no 
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of all expected revenue and expenditures. Inserting (4) into (3a), removing At, and solving 
for e yields 
(5) 
E 
e = i - -=------
R -D 
(i - y) 
For various values ofE, R, D, i andy, the upper limit to government expenditure 
growth can be calculated if the solvency constraint is to be met. Note that (5) holds only in 
a constant price environment. In an inflationary environment, if prices have increased 
revenue and expenditure received at the end of the financial year are worth less in present 
value terms. All growth and interest rates in (3a) must be multiplied by the expected rate 
of inflation to allow for this. Within the parenthesis, inflation appears in both the 
numerator and the denominator, and thus cancels out. Only the term outside the 
parenthesis is affected by the introduction of inflation, and the result is: 




where 7r is the inflation rate. When (1 + 7r) is taken across to the other side and the 





(i - y) 
5.3 Expenditure Growth Options for Sustainable Fiscal Policy in South Africa 
The values for E, Rand D can be taken from the 1996/97 budget. Budgeted 
revenue R for the year is R144 857 million. Included in this is an amount of Rl 880 
million of revenue earned through the sale of strategic fuel reserves which cannot be 
considered a sustainable source of revenue. The full amount is included in the calculations 
for 1996/97, but tax revenue for the 1997/98 year is calculated by increasing tax revenues 
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Budgeted expenditure for the year is R173 659,4 million. Subtracting R34 445 
million for interest costs leaves R139 214 million of non-interest expenditure. Budgeted 
expenditure increased by 5.4% from 1995/96 to 1996/97, and a further 3.5% increase 
from 1996/97 to 1997/98 is predicted. Debt at 31 March 1996 is estimated at R280 
billion, and GDP for the year ending 31 March 1996 is estimated at R500 billion. The rate 
of inflation, 1[, is assumed to be 7.5% 
The current real interest rate for government is approximately 8%. While this 
interest rate may be maintained at least until the tum of the century, it is arguable whether 
a real interest rate of 8% could be sustainable. Calculations were done using an estimated 
future interest rate of 5%, 6.5%, and 8%. 




Future economic growth is uncertain. While the consensus view appears to be an 
economic growth rate of approximately 3.5% for 199624, this may be the climax of an 
economic upturn, soon to be followed by recession. Estimates for the limit of growth of 
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government expenditure were computed using economic growth rates of 3%, 3.5% and 
4%. 
Revenue for the 1997/98 financial year had to be estimated to free the revenue 
totals of the distorting influence of capital revenues from fuel sales. Expenditure for 
1997/98 then also had to be estimated (3.5% real growth on the 1996/97 expenditures) so 
that expenditure and revenue had a common base year. The expenditure growth paths 
illustrated in Table 5.1 are the maximum sustainable growth paths for government 
expenditure for the financial year 1998/1999 onwards, given various growth and interest 
rates. 
If a consistent economic growth rate of 4% is achieved, and if real interest rates 
have decreased to 5% by March 1998, then government expenditure can increase to a rate 
of 4% and debt will still be bounded by government collateral. But if a real growth rate of 
3% is achieved, and real interest rates remain at 8%, real government expenditure can only 
increase at a rate of 2.5% per annum. To put these figures into perspective, average real 
expenditure growth rates for various periods are tabulated below. 
Table 5.2. Average Government Expenditure Growth: Selected Periods 
1996 - 1997 (budgeted) 5.41% 
The present budgeted expenditure increase of 5.4% exceeds even the most 
optimistic estimates of sustainable expenditure growth. If interest rates remain at 8%, and 
an average growth rate of 3.5% is achieved, the rate of growth in government expenditure 
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For the sake of fiscal planning, assume that an average economic growth rate of 
3.5% is expected. Given the current anti-inflation position of the Reserve Bank, the 
continued high demand for credit extension, and the fact that investment exceeds savings 
in South Africa at present, a substantial decrease in the real interest rate may be a long 
time in coming. Assuming real interest rates fall to 6.5%25 (with 7.5% inflation, this would 
mean a nominal interest rate of 14.5%) expenditure growth cannot be allowed to exceed 
3.4%. 
5.4 Limitations of the Analysis 
The major limitation of the analysis thus far is that it is static in the extreme. 
Firstly, the various expenditure and revenue paths are assumed to have no effect on the 
real interest rate or the economic growth rate. Secondly, no attempt has been made to 
determine to what extent government can change the levels and growth rates of revenue, 
expenditure, and debt, and to calculate how this would affect the solvency constraint. 
5.4.1 Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth 
To address the first limitation, one would have to estimate the effects of taxes, 
government spending and debt on economic growth. If fiscal policy affects aggregate 
demand, it must affect the economic growth rate in an economy operating at less than full 
capacity. Increased growth could, in turn, attract further investment. Government 
spending could also affect growth through investment in human capital and infrastructure. 
Finally, fiscal policy could help create a positive environment for investment. Investors 
may perceive that the risk of macroeconomic instability is lower in a country with low debt 
and deficit ratios, and this could affect the direction of investment. 
Given the different ways that fiscal policy can affect growth, and given that these 
effects may depend not on the fiscal policy itself, but on investors' perceptions of fiscal 
policy, it would be impossible to estimate the total effect of fiscal policy on growth. 
25 An asswnption on the interest rate is made simply to illustrate possible policy implications of the analysis. Many 
commentators expect a far more rapid fall in the interest rate. GEAR, for example, expect the real bank rate to 
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Instead, the approach here will be to examine the various expenditure growth paths 
outlined above that obey the solvency constraint, and to see what happens to various key 
ratios such as the debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios in the long run. While the 
expenditure and revenue paths may obey the solvency condition that government debt 
remains bounded by government collateral, the deficit and debt ratios that these 
expenditure and revenue paths produce may not be consistent with the assumed future 
economic growth rate. If deficits or debt to GDP become too high, the combination of the 
continued contractionary fiscal policy and the potential macro instability can undermine 
growth. In addition, the private sector may no longer want to lend to government. The 
deficit could take up an increasingly larger portion of South African savings, or as debt 
increases, the public might become aware of government's increasing incentive to default 
on the debt. For whatever reason, despite the solvency constraint being met, the debt 
situation could become untenable. 
The expected movements in the key ratios for three of the scenarios for the period 
2000 to 2100 are shown in Table 5.3. The high growthllow interest rate scenario and the 
low growthlhigh interest rate scenario will be considered in some depth. The middle 
growth/middle interest rate scenario is included in Table 5.3 simply to give the reader an 
idea of the rate of change in the key ratios when growth and interest rates change. 
Detailed movements in the key ratios for all nine scenarios are included in appendix B. 
The High Growth/Low Interest Scenario 
First, the most optimistic growth scenano will be considered, with economic 
growth continuing to average 4% forever and the real interest rate falling to 5%. It is 
assumed that expenditure grows at the limit of its boundedness (i.e. it grows as fast as it 
can while still fulfilling the solvency condition), which in this case is 4% per annum. 
Movements in the key ratios are shown in column 1 of Table 5.3. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio starts decreasing immediately, and will be less then 50% by 
the year 2020. Perhaps the best measure of the aggregate demand effect offiscal policy on 
the economy is the primary balance. While this remains in surplus, it is less than 0.8% in 
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Table 5.3. Future Debt and Deficit ratios assuming selected 














The only possible concern regarding this scenario is the conventional deficit. The 
conventional deficit is the popular measure of fiscal discipline. While the expenditure and 
tax revenue paths outlined are consistent with macroeconomic stability, the perception 
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on foreign investment to other developing countries with lower conventional deficits, even 
if the policies themselves are sustainable. 
These key ratio movements were calculated assuming that the expenditure grew at 
the allowable maximum of 4%. The 1996/97 year excluded, expenditure has in fact grown 
at an average rate of nearer 3.3% over the last decade. If a rate of 3.5% were maintained, 
a balanced budget would be achieved by the year 2018. The debt-to-GDP ratio would be 
23.8%, but the primary surplus would be 3% and rising. It is doubtful whether an 
economic growth rate of 4% could be maintained in the face of a primary surplus of 3%, 
but expenditure growth would no longer be at the limit of boundedness. There would thus 
be scope for increasing expenditure to promote growth. By the year 2018, the rate of 
expenditure growth consistent with the solvency constraint would exceed 4.1 %. 
The South African fiscal authorities would be forced to choose between high 
expenditure growth combined with higher conventional deficits, or lower expenditure 
growth combined with high primary surpluses. Although there is no technical reason why 
moderate conventional deficits of just over 5% should tarnish South Africa's image in the 
eyes of investors, fiscal authorities will lose credibility if they do not achieve the deficit 
targets outlined in GEAR (1996). Alternatively, the falling debt ratio could be evidence 
enough of South Africa's commitment to fiscal discipline. In addition, the higher 
expenditure growth rate gives fiscal authorities more scope for addressing the backlog in 
social services to the poorer communities in the country. But if government is unsure 
about the returns on additional expenditures, they could reduce debt or reduce taxes. 
In summary, if real interest rates are 5% and the economy grows at 4%, there is no 
reason why expenditure growth rates of 4% should be growth-inhibiting. In fact, the 
steady decline in the debt-, conventional deficit- and primary surplus-to-GDP ratios should 
contribute to an environment of macroeconomic stability. This, in tum, would promote 
investment and stimulate economic growth. In the high growth/low interest rate scenario, 












Does South Africa's Government Debt Threaten the Sustainability of Fiscal Policy? 1/6/97 
The Low Growth/High Interest Scenario 
The second scenario to be considered is the low growthlhigh interest rate scenario. 
If the maximum sustainable expenditure growth path is followed, the key ratios will follow 
the paths outlined in column 3 of Table 5.3. The primary surplus, conventional deficit and 
debt ratios are all high and rise dramatically over the entire period. 
If expenditure grows at 2.5% per annum, the conventional deficit reaches 10% by 
2010, the primary surplus reaches 3% by 2020, and the debt ratio reaches 100% by 2018. 
The increase in all three ratios could, through their effect on growth and the general 
perception of government solvency, cause the expenditure growth of 2.5% to become 
unsustainable. 
Both the primary and conventional budget imbalances affect economic growth. 
The high primary surpluses decrease aggregate demand. In a demand-constrained 
economy with spare capacity, such as in South Africa, this puts downward pressure on 
economic growth. In addition, the high conventional deficits may increase the perceived 
risk to investors. Because increased risk implies a decreased risk-adjusted return, 
investment would consequently decrease. Low investment would slow economic growth. 
The slower economic growth rate would mean a slower growth in tax revenues, 
which in tum implies a decrease in government collateral. The expenditure growth rate 
was determined assuming government collateral equalled government debt. If collateral 
decreases because of slow growth, collateral becomes less than debt, and government is 
bankrupt. 
Government can also become insolvent if the debt ratio keeps rising. Even if 
government is solvent in the technical sense of the word and a 3% economic growth rate 
can be maintained despite the increasing budget imbalances, the increasing debt ratio may 
cause the public to doubt government's ability to redeem the debt. In addition the public 
will be aware of government's increasing incentive to default as the debt ratio rises. For 
both reasons, the public may be unwilling to take up bond issues. If government cannot 
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Government cannot avoid the high primary surpluses, as movements in the key 
ratios were calculated with expenditure growing at its maximum sustainable rate. To stop 
the conventional deficit and debt ratios increasing rapidly, government could reduce 
expenditure. But this would result in increasingly contractionary primary surpluses, 
reduced aggregate demand, and slower growth. 
In addition, in order to reduce government expenditure, government would have to 
lower public spending on social and economic services. Apart from the effect this would 
have on growth, one has to ask by how much expenditure growth can be reduced? South 
Africa's population is currently growing at a rate of 2.02%26 a year. The majority of 
government expenditures are on social and economic services. If the level of services is to 
be maintained in the absence of major public service efficiency gains, then expenditure will 
have to grow by at least 2.02% a year as well. Note that this is only sufficient to maintain 
service standards, and not to improve them. Any attempts to address the chronic social 
backlog will have to be made at the cost of decreasing the quality of services in other 
areas. If taxpayers perceive that the standard of services they are receiving from 
government is dropping, their resistance to paying taxes may increase. 
A weakness of the analysis is that interest rates remain constant, regardless of what 
happens to economic growth. If growth were to slow down, would it be reasonable to 
assume interest rates remained as high as 8%? Perhaps not. But South Africa's high real 
interest rate may be due in part to risk perceptions based on the large conventional deficit. 
Increasing conventional deficits and the increased risk of government defaulting in the face 
of a growing debt-to-GDP ratio would all put upward pressure on the real interest rate. It 
would not be prudent to rely on falling real interest rates to ensure the sustainability of 
fiscal policy. 
If the worst case scenario of3% economic growth and 8% interest is expected, the 
answer to the debt problem will not be found in fiscal restructuring. A combination of high 
interest rates and low economic growth will ensure that government becomes insolvent, 
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regardless of fiscal policies chosen. This situation can be called a pre-privatisation debt 
trap. Either state assets must be privati sed to payoff government debt, or the tight 
monetary policy stance must be relaxed to lower real interest rates. Both solutions will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
The analysis shows that sustainable expenditure growth is closely linked to the 
economic growth rate. Expenditure can only be increased to rates above those outlined in 
Table 5.1 if there is a genuine expectation that the spending policies implemented will be 
growth enhancing. If increased expenditure does not lead to increased growth, the 
adjustment process becomes progressively more painful. 
Advocates of expansionary fiscal policies aimed at kick-starting economic growth 
in South Africa suggest a risky path. Increased fiscal deficits put upward pressure on the 
interest rates. The more interest rates increase due to fiscal policy, the greater the increase 
in fiscal policy-induced economic growth must be to ensure that the policy is sustainable. 
The consequence of policy failure is high. If economic growth does not respond to high 
deficit spending, the country will be saddled with high levels of debt, high interest rates, 
and high conventional deficits which result from high interest costs27 . 
5.4.2 Factors Affecting Sustainable Expenditure Growth Paths 
Solutions to the debt problem, such as privatisation of state assets and a relaxing 
of monetary discipline, were mentioned in the previous section. By privati sing government 
assets, the state could raise significant revenues and write these off against the state debt. 
Estimates of the amount of revenue government could earn through privatisation have 
varied from RJO billion to RIOO billion. But the privatisation process is fraught with 
political problems. Organised labour fears that privatisation will mean job losses as the 
companies aim for increased efficiency, and that privatisation will make the ownership 
structure in the South African economy even more concentrated. In addition, some public 
27 In a small open economy such as South Africa, expansionary fiscal polices also face a Balance of Payments 
constraint. In addition, the public sector's ability to absorb additional funds is doubtful. For a brief discussion on 
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companies play a redistributory role by providing certain basic goods at below market 
price. The policing of this role may become more difficult if the company were privatised. 
While relaxing monetary discipline would decrease interest costs in the short term, 
it could have counterproductive inflationary consequences. The fear is that added macro-
instability could further decrease economic growth. Even though interest costs would fall, 
so too would government revenues. 
Both privatisation and an easing of monetary discipline carry costs. The aim is to 
determine what the benefits would be in terms of increased allowable expenditure growth 
if such policies were undertaken. Consider: 
(5a) 
. E 
e = 1 - -R-----
--- D(l + n) 
(i - y) 
Firstly, the issue of privatisation must be examined. If a marginal change in D does 
not affect any of the other variables, (a reasonable assumption), then taking the partial 
derivative of e with respect to D will yield the rate at which expenditure growth can 
change if state assets are privati sed and the proceeds used to reduce government debt. 
(6) 
8 e E(l + n) -- - --;----'---'---;---
8 D (~_ D(l + 7l")11\2 
l-Y ) 
Expenditure (E) and Revenue (R) are given, and will not be discussed. The sign of 
(6) shows the expected fact that as debt decreases, expenditure growth can increase and 
still maintain the collateral constraint. The noteworthy result in (6) is that the amount 
expenditure growth can increase with a decrease in debt is strongly dependent on the 
denominator in equation (6). The lower the denominator, the greater is the whole 
function. More specifically, the greater the difference between interest rates and growth 
rates, the greater the benefits of reducing debt. This result is confirmed if the allowed 
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For the high growthllow interest rate scenario, eliminating debt merely increases 
allowable expenditure growth from 4.01% to 4.03%. But for the high interest ratellow 
growth scenario, allowable expenditure increases from 2.5% to 3.1 %, an increase of 0.6 of 
a percent. The message is clear: if high growth is expected and interest rates do not remain 
excessive, the public debt does not constrain fiscal policy. But if the economy is expected 
to perform poorly, the benefits of privatisation are marked28 . In any case, privatisation in 
the low growthlhigh interest scenario may be the only method of avoiding fiscal crisis. 





The issue of relaxing monetary policy is more complex. The partial derivative of 
allowable expenditure growth with respect to interest rate is: 
28 This statement deals only with the effect of privati sat ion on the debt stock. Ifprivatisation increased economic 
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ER 
(7) 8e = 1- (i - y)"2 
8 i (~_ D(1 + 7r)"L'2 
l-y ) 
Equation (7) can either be negative or positive, depending on the relative sizes of 
debt (0), revenue (R), and expenditure (E). If debt is zero and tax revenue exceeds non-
interest government expenditure, the partial derivative is positive. Increasing the interest 
rate increases the rate of expenditure growth consistent with the collateral constraint, 
regardless of the values of i and y. But as debt increases, (7) becomes negative. Increasing 
interest rates imply higher interest costs, and thus growth of non-interest expenditure is 
constrained. 
The effect of the difference between i and y appears ambiguous in equation (7), but 
for the current values ofD, E and R in South Africa, certain relationships are noticeable. If 
debt is zero, changes in i do not affect e if y is constant. But if debt is positive, then the 
greater the difference between i and y, the more an increase in interest rates inhibits fiscal 
policy. 
Table 5.5. The Interest Elasticity of Permissible Expenditure Growth Rates (lieI8i) 
•......• < .·t·.·.·.·. •• ....·(Q·fJU 
(0.194) 
(O.Q~O) (0.160) 
Note: Brackets indicate negative values. 
Table 5.5 requires some explanation. The data show the rate of change in 
permissible expenditure growth rates for a 1% change in interest rates. For example, if the 
growth rate was 3.5% and the real interest rate was 6.5%, then, at current levels of debt, a 
1 % increase in the interest rate would cause the permissible expenditure growth rate 
consistent with the collateral constraint to fall by 0.111%. The table shows clearly that 
changes in interest rates, given our current debt levels, will relax the pressure on fiscal 












Does South Africa's Government Debt Threaten the Sustainability of Fiscal Policy? 1/6/97 
the country with a skewed income distribution will pay more tax than an individual with 
the same income in the country with the more even income distribution. If the relatively 
wealthier South Africans already pay as much tax as their European counterparts30, 
increasing tax revenues would have to mean increasing taxes on the lower income groups. 
Secondly, the amount of tax revenue raised is dependent to some extent on the 
willingness of taxpayers to pay the tax. This may be high in various OECD countries, 
where the wealthy receive substantial high quality government services. But in South 
Africa, more and more expenditure is being directed at easing the plight of the previously 
disadvantaged black community, while less is being spent on the relatively wealthy 
whites31 . Willingness to pay is accordingly not high. If, for example, the wealthy were to 
receive free schooling and medical services, they could perhaps be persuaded to pay more 
tax. The fact that the wealthy carry a heavy tax burden but receive little in terms of 
government services puts a limit to the amount of tax revenues government can raise. 
Increased taxes may face fierce resistance if the taxpayers perceive that they don't benefit 
from these taxes. 
Thirdly, even if taxes can be increased as a percentage of GDP, it is not desirable 
to do so if it will hamper economic growth. High tax rates may make South Africa a poor 
investment proposition. South Africa already raises far greater levels of tax revenue than 
the developing countries it competes against. From 1986 to 1990, South Africa raised tax 
revenues on average equal to 25.8% of GDP (IMF, 1995, p.99). For the same period, 
average tax revenues as a percentage of GDP were 14.1% for non-OECD Asian countries, 
30 " ... the tax share of white South Africans is very high by the standards of other middle income countries and at 
least comparable to that prevailing, on average, in the industrial countries" (IMF, 1992, p. 29) In 1988, white 
South Africans paid 32% of their incomes in taxes. 
31 IMF (1992) introduced the concept of a net tax burden, which is equal to the amount of tax revenue paid, less the 
value of the education, health, housing and social welfare services received by each racial group, as a percentage of 
GDP. White South Africans bore a net tax burden of23.3% in 1987, while the net tax burden on blacks for the 
same year was -3.41%. (p. 30). The net tax burden on whites was more than double the average net tax burden for 
any other country measured. The country with the second highest net tax burden was Canada (11.06). While the 
wealthy, white population of South Africa is being compared to the entire populations of the OECD countries, this 
does not detract from the relevance of the measure because the per capita income for white South Africans is lower 
than the per capita income for their OECD counterparts. The per capita income of white South Africans in 1992 
was $9725 (Whiteford and McGrath, 1994, p. 36), while the average per capita income in OECD countries in 1992 
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16.5% for non-OECD western hemisphere countries, and 13.6% for middle-eastern 
countries. No non-OECD Asian countries and only Barbados and St Lucia of the non-
OECD western hemisphere countries raised greater levels of tax than South Africa. Fiscal 
policies here that necessitate future tax increases will make South Africa increasingly less 
competitive internationally. In short, it may not be prudent for South Africa to implement 
fiscal policies that depend on tax revenue increasing as a percentage of GOP. 
To determine a minimum expenditure growth rate needed to maintain standards of 
government services, a population growth rate of 2.02% was used. However, the 
population growth rate is expected to fall, and while it is 2.02% at present, it is expected 
to average 1. 5 % over the next 30 years32. Therefore real expenditure growth to maintain 
the quality of service standards may not need to be more than 1.5%, which is far less than 
the 2.5% used in the analysis. 
If expenditure grows at 1.5% per annum, it may be possible to avoid the debt trap 
even in our worst case scenario of 3% growth and 8% real interest rates, but only if 
growth of3% can be maintained. Table 5.2 shows that South Africa has never come close 
to achieving an expenditure growth rate as low as 1.5%. In addition, the greater the 
difference between expenditure growth and revenue growth, the faster the primary surplus 
increases. Large primary surpluses reduce aggregate demand and will inevitably affect 
economic growth. Taxpayers will continue to bear a heavy tax burden while receiving little 
in the form of government services, and resistance to taxes may well increase. The debt 
trap can be avoided only if the 1.5% expenditure growth, the 3% revenue growth, and the 
3% economic growth can be maintained, which is doubtful under the circumstances. 
Policy Implications 
The results illustrated in Tables 5.1 to 5.5 show the relationship between economic 
growth, interest rates and expenditure growth. The results do not outline an optimal fiscal 
policy path to follow, they simply define the options available to fiscal policy makers. 
Certain crucial points become evident. 












Does South Africa's Government Debt Threaten the Sustainability of Fiscal Policy? 1/6/97 
Fiscal policy is constrained by economic growth. If South Africa can achieve 
growth of 4% or above, the current debt stock will not hamper fiscal policy. But if growth 
averages at 3% or less, a debt trap may no longer be avoidable through fiscal 
restructuring. Privatisation of state assets may be necessary to maintain government 
solvency. The benefits of privatisation increase as the difference between growth rates and 
interest rates increases. 
Fiscal policy that can give rise to and maintain high economic growth is desirable. 
But if policies involve extensive deficit spending to achieve growth, and the expected 
growth does not materialise, painful fiscal restructuring will have to occur in the future. 
While bad policies guarantee poor economic growth, good policies will not necessarily 
ensure high growth. The prudent approach might be to accept that fiscal policies have had 
a limited effect in stimulating growth, to make reasonably conservative estimates of future 
economic growth, and to let expenditure grow accordingly. 
The current high real interest rates and the high level of debt-to-GDP are not 
compatible if high GDP growth is not achieved. Either monetary policy must be relaxed, 
or fiscal policy must be tightened. The cost of relaxing monetary policy is inflation, while 
the cost of tightening fiscal policy could be a slowdown in the development of social 
services for the poor. The analysis provides the set of possible policy options facing 
government. The aim here is not to choose between these policy options, but to indicate 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
6.1 Analytical Conclusions 
Whether or not macroeconomic stability in South Africa is threatened by the high 
level of public debt depends on the general perception of government solvency. 
Government solvency, in turn, depends on future fiscal policies, interest rates and 
economic growth. 
Is Current South African Fiscal Policy Sustainable? 
This paper set out to answer two questions. The first question, "Is current South 
African fiscal policy sustainable?", was answered by testing whether or not South Africa 
has obeyed its intertemporal budget constraint. Whereas fiscal policy in the 1960s and 
1970s was sustainable, the same cannot be said for fiscal policy since 1982. Cointegration 
tests show that the long term stable relationship between government expenditure and 
revenue has weakened over the past decade and a half If spending and revenue continue 
to follow their current trends, the present value of future government debt is greater than 
zero, and government is therefore insolvent. 
The evidence indicates that in the 1960s and 1970s, a decision to increase 
government spending was accompanied by a concurrent decision to increase tax revenues. 
While economic recessions may have caused taxes and expenditure to diverge in the short 
term, these movements were corrected for in the long term. If government increased 
spending, they also increased tax revenues to finance this spending. 
In the 1980s this stable relationship broke down. Spending and revenue appear to 
have been driven by independent forces. Total government spending has increased because 
of increased spending on social services in an attempt to reduce the social backlog, and 
higher interest costs on the public debt. At the same time, an upper bound on tax revenues 
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therefore only increase at the rate of economic growth. Expenditure increases that exceed 
the rate of economic growth cannot be matched by equivalent increases in tax revenue, 
and hence the fiscal position steadily worsens. 
Clearly, current fiscal policy is not sustainable. South Africa must change its fiscal 
stance. This can be done either by increasing economic growth and thereby increasing the 
rate of growth of tax revenues, or by decreasing the expenditure growth rate. But 
increasing growth is obviously no simple matter, and government is committed to certain 
social expenditures in its attempts to improve the plight of the South African poor. Thus 
government's ability to increase tax revenues is limited economically, and its ability to 
decrease expenditure is constrained politically. 
What are the Constraints on Future Fiscal Policy? 
The collateral constraint was used to specify exactly what combinations of 
economic and expenditure growth rates and interest rates are required for the South 
African government to remain solvent. 
Various future economic growth and interest rates were assumed, and the 
maximum allowable expenditure growth rates satisfying government's collateral constraint 
were calculated. As shown in Table 5.1, expenditure can grow at 4% if real interest rates 
are 5% and an economic growth rate of 4% is achieved, but it can only grow at 2.5% if 
the real interest rate rises to 8% and economic growth averages 3%. Permissible 
expenditure growth rates for economic growth and interest rates between those mentioned 
here are detailed in Appendix B. 
The analysis assumes that the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth and 
interest rates is constant. However, the expenditure paths outlined in Table 5.1 for each 
rate of economic growth may well give rise to debt and deficit ratios incompatible with the 
economic growth rate they were estimated from. 
For the high growth/low interest rate scenario, with government expenditure 
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Clearly, the level of debt will not constrain fiscal policy, and fiscal policy will not constrain 
economic growth. 
But as expected growth rates decrease and interest rates increase, the debt-, 
conventional deficit- and primary surplus-to-GDP ratios all increase. This could render 
fiscal policy unsustainable, either through the effect of the deficits on economic growth, or 
through the effect of debt on the general perception of government solvency. When this 
happens at an already low rate of expenditure growth, the possibility of a debt trap arises. 
At an economic growth rate of 3%, a real interest rate of 8%, and a maximum 
allowable expenditure growth rate of 2.5%, all three key ratios increase dramatically. The 
conventional deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios could be decreased by drastically reducing 
expenditure, but this would imply increased primary surpluses, which would further reduce 
aggregate demand and could slow economic growth. In addition, the expenditure cuts 
might not be politically feasible. Government is then in what might be called a pre-
privatisation debt trap. Government insolvency can no longer be avoided merely by fiscal 
restructuring; either assets must be sold, or the debt must be monetised. If keeping control 
over inflation is seen as vital to economic growth, state assets would have to be sold if 
government is to avoid bankruptcy. 
Privatisation 
The issue of privatisation is complex, dogged by many political economy factors. 
However, government may have no choice on whether or not to privatise if it is the only 
method of avoiding insolvency. The benefits of privatisation increase with an increase in 
the interest rate/growth differential. 
Monetary Policy 
If government were willing to accept some inflation for lower interest rates, the 
pressure on fiscal policy would be relaxed most effectively when interest rates are high and 
growth is slow. In addition to lowering interest costs, lower interest rates might also 
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Alternatively, increased inflation could decrease investment by increasing the 
perceived risk to investors. In addition, whereas non-accommodating monetary policy 
forces government to confront its budget constraint, accommodating monetary policy may 
increase the incentives for fiscal authorities to pursue a more expansionary fiscal regime33 . 
If fiscal authorities know that the monetary sector will absorb some of the effects of their 
fiscal excesses, they may be less inclined towards fiscal discipline. This is evidenced in the 
South African situation. The government ran primary deficits unchecked throughout the 
seventies and eighties, and it is only since monetary policy has tightened that debt has 
caused public concern. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
The analysis carries a number of implications for the country's fiscal policy. South 
Africa must change its fiscal stance, as current fiscal policies are not sustainable. If current 
policies are maintained, government will become insolvent, causing inflation to increase. 
Macroeconomic instability will result, which could decrease economic growth. 
Arguments in favour of increasing tax revenue as a percentage of GDP are not 
convincing, and it can thus be assumed that growth in tax revenues is constrained by GDP 
growth. If future real interest rates are assumed, permissible combinations of expenditure 
and GDP growth consistent with government solvency can be calculated. If future GDP 
growth is also predicted, a unique, sustainable expenditure growth path is defined. It 
remains to estimate future interest and GDP growth rates, and thereby define the limits to 
future growth in government spending. 
It must be emphasised that the analysis is not prescriptive, and does not provide an 
optimal fiscal policy path. It defines a set of deficit and growth combinations that will 
ensure technical solvency. The policy makers must then estimate future GDP growth and 
interest rates to determine which of the sustainable fiscal policy paths is attainable. 
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Both the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate fluctuate continuously, and 
therefore predicting the real interest rate is hazardous. However, because government 
borrows long (the average term to maturity on marketable government stock is 91/ 2 years
34 
at March 1996), it is committed to paying interest at the current rate until the stock is 
redeemed. The average nominal interest rate on bonds with a ten year or longer maturity 
since 1982 has been 15%.35 Of the total government debt ofR280 billion on the 31 March 
1996, R250 billion is marketable domestic debt. Of this R250 billion, only R23 billion is 
scheduled to be redeemed by the end of 1997, and less than R50 billion is to be redeemed 
by the end of the century. Until then, government will continue to pay interest at a nominal 
rate of 15% on at least 80% of the total stock of marketable debt. 
It is improbable that the average nominal interest rate on government bonds will be 
below 14% by the year 2000. The real interest rate, therefore, depends on future inflation 
rate movements. If 7% inflation is maintained, the real interest rate will be 6.5%. 
Growth in GDP is more difficult to forecast, but attempts at prediction can be 
made based either on economic fundamentals or historical precedent. 
Considering the fundamentals, it has been estimated that a domestic savings rate of 
22% of GDP is necessary to sustain real economic growth of 2.5% per annum, while a 
savings rate of 24% is required to maintain a 3.5% growth rate. 36 Shortfalls in savings 
may, however, be met by capital inflows. 
In 1995, the domestic savings ratio equalled 16.7% ofGDP, a 0.5% decrease from 
the 1994 value of 17.2%. Capital inflows of3.5% ofGDP were measured in 1995, while 
gold and foreign reserves decreased by 0.9% of GDP. Consequently, an amount equal to 
19.3% was available for investment, which is far below the 24% estimated as necessary to 
maintain 3.5% real growth. 
34 South African Reserve Bank (1996), p. S-64. 
3S This was calculated on the basis of an unweighted average of monthly interest rates on government stock since 
1982. 
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But savings levels could easily increase to their early 1980s levels of 24.5%. If 
savings do increase, and capital continues to flow into the country, future growth will not 
be constrained by a lack of funds available for investment. 
Historical data shows that since 1946, South African real GDP growth has 
averaged 3.3%. If GDP was an 1(1) process, such that GDP growth was stationary, 
average future growth could be expected to equal average historical growth. If future 
growth is to average a rate higher than the historical average, the underlying structure of 
the economy that generates growth would have to change. 
However, an examination of real GDP trends in South Africa from 1946 to 1995 
shows that the GDP series is an 1(2) process and GDP growth is 1(1).37 GDP growth 
appears to follow a random walk, and therefore analysing past growth rates reveals little 
about future growth rates. 
Neither the fundamentals nor the historical precedent indicate a probable future 
GDP growth path. Real economic growth of 3.5% is predicted for 1996, but growth is 
expected to be slower in 1997.38 While we have been unable to predict future economic 
growth, for the sake of illustrating policy implications, it is assumed that real growth will 
remain between 3% and 3.5%. 
If future real interest rates of6.5% and growth rates of3% to 3.5% are expected, 
government expenditure growth must remain between 2.8% and 3.4% for government to 
remain stable. An economic growth rate of3.5% may be difficult to achieve in the face of 
rising conventional deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios (Conventional deficit and debt-to-GDP 
ratios would be 8.8% and 78.5% respectively by 2020), but these ratios could be reduced 
by decreasing expenditure growth to 3.25% per annum. However, this would cause the 
primary surplus to be increasingly contractionary, reaching a level of2% ofGDP by 2020. 
37 The first difference of GDP growth with four lags is stationary at the 5% level. 
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If economic growth of 3% is to be achieved, the maximum allowable expenditure 
growth rate would be 2.8%. But at this rate, the key ratios react even more dramatically. 
The conventional deficit would reach 10% of GOP by 2023, and the debt ratio 100% by 
2030. Decreasing expenditure to prevent increases in the debt and deficit ratios would 
simply result in an increase in primary surpluses, which would slow growth. 
Anything that leads to increased growth will ensure that government remains 
solvent. If increased government expenditure, spent for example on infrastructure 
investment, could ensure increased economic growth, then the government would have no 
reason for concern about the debt situation. But if these high expenditure policies fail to 
stimulate economic growth, they will simply accelerate government's move to fiscal 
bankruptcy. 
Privatising state assets may relieve some of the pressure on fiscal policy. How 
much revenue there is to be gained from selling state assets is, however, doubtful. 
Estimates on the value of marketable state assets have ranged from R30 to R100 billion. 
Assuming the R100 billion could be realised immediately, expenditure growth .could be 
increased from 2.8% to 2.9%, or from 3.4% to 3.45%, depending on the growth rate. The 
key ratios (debt-, conventional deficit- and primary surplus-to-GDP ratios) would also 
increase at a slower rate. 
The increases in expenditure growth are fairly small, and while privatisation 
revenues may decrease pressure on fiscal policy, they would not be sufficient to solve the 
debt problem. Monetising the deficit would cause macroeconomic instability, and should 
be regarded as the result of government insolvency rather than the cure. 
The only solution to South Africa's debt problem is economic growth. Paths for 
expenditure growth have been outlined for various estimates of interest and economic 
growth, but the challenge is to maintain these levels of economic growth despite primary 
surpluses. Any factors that enhance growth increase the flexibility of fiscal policy, and 
consequently increase government's ability to address social issues in South Africa. 
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6.3 The Collateral Constraint in Macroeconomic Models 
The reformulation of the collateral constraint proposed in this dissertation 
constitutes a theoretical advance because it identifies the range of sustainable fiscal polices 
for given macroeconomic conditions. Integrating the reformulated constraint 10 a 
macroeconomic model would increase the robustness of the econometric analysis. 
If the collateral constraint is considered in isolation, expected economic growth 
determines the limits to expenditure growth if government is to remain solvent. In doing 
so, it ascertains the limits to the primary39 and conventional deficits. The causality runs 
one way, from growth to deficits. 
But the causality between growth and deficits is bi-directional. 40 In a 
macroeconomic model that recognises the relationship between deficits and growth, the 
deficits would feed into the GDP growth forecasts. The changed growth forecast would 
then change the limits to permissible deficits. Growth would affect deficits, and deficits 
would affect growth. 
Couching the collateral constraint 10 a macro model would emphasise the 
relationship between fiscal sustainability and growth, particularly if the effect of the 
primary surplus on growth is strong. If high and rising primary surpluses slowed GDP 
growth, the value of future tax revenues would decrease. Expenditure growth would have 
to decrease to maintain solvency, but this would increase the primary surplus, resulting in 
a downward growth spiral. 
Alternatively, if increased government spending increased growth, the present 
value of future tax revenues would increase. Consequently, government would be able to 
increase expenditure, which would again increase growth. 
In either case, the growth spiral, be it upward or downward, would be emphasised, 
and unsustainable fiscal policies would be more easily identified. Including the collateral 
constraint in a macro model would ensure that the limits to fiscal policy would be more 
39 Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the primary balance would have to be in surplus. The word "deficit" is used here 
simply for ease of expression 
40 Ahsan et al (1989), amongst others, present evidence ofbi-directional causality between growth in government 
expenditure and GDP growth. If tax revenues are constrained, this implies a similar relationship between deficits 
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evident and more accurately quantifiable. The macro model itself would become more 
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Appendix A 
The Derivation of Government's Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
Government's one period budget identity is 
Assume t=1. Then to solve (1) forward, we solve for Bo. This yields 
Using the same method, Bl is equal to 
Now inserting (3) into (2) yields 
(4) Bo = (Rl - G1)/(1 + h) + [(R2 - G2)/(1 + h) + B2/(l + h)]/(1 + h) 
Rearranging the terms in (4) yields 
It is obvious from (5) that continually substituting for the 'B' term on the right hand side 
will finally yield (6) 
(6) Bo = (Rl - Gl)/(l + il) + ... + (Roo - G",)/[(1 + h) ... (l + I",)] + 
Bd[(l + h) ... (l + i",)] 
which is the mathematical equivalent of equation (2) in chapter (3) 
00 
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Appendix B 
Tables B.l to B.3 show movements in the key ratios for all nine growth and 
interest rate assumptions. 
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